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There has never been a more vibrant time for historians of British 
naval history in the years preceding the outbreak of the First World 
War. The past several years have witnessed the proliferation of 
interest in and scholarship on the topic, which has served to expand 
our understanding of a wide range of important issues. Until recently, 
this process has been characterised by attempts by a group of 
revisionist historians to break free of what remains the first and only 
comprehensive scholarly synthesis yet produced – that of the 
pioneering American historian Arthur J. Marder. Marder’s over-arching 
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synthesis, which remains the key resource on the topic for the 
majority of non-specialists, established the narrative of the 
inspirational First Sea Lord Admiral Sir John ‘Jackie’ Fisher presiding 
over a period of ‘revolutionary’ and transformational change in naval 
affairs before the outbreak of War. Seeking to shake the service free of 
its alleged Victorian stupor and to prepare it to wage modern industrial 
war against Germany, Fisher both introduced radical new types of 
warship – epitomized by HMS Dreadnought – and also concentrated 
the navy’s major assets in its future battleground, the North Sea. The 
consequence of Fisher’s efforts was that, when war came in 1914, the 
German battle fleet was directly faced by a much stronger and more 
formidable opponent in the form of the British Grand Fleet, a 
concentrated and powerful force of dreadnought battleships that 
blocked German access to the high seas. As a result, Germany’s 
battleships remained bottled up in harbour for much of the war before 
ultimately being interned in 1918 and scuttled in Scapa Flow in 1919. 
 
Beginning in the late 1970s, however, a group of revisionist scholars 
began to challenge some of the central elements of Marder’s thesis. 
These revisionist historians agree with Marder that Fisher transformed 
the Royal Navy, but they contest the nature, origins and aims of the 
changes that took place. Rejecting Marder’s argument that Fisher’s 
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inspiration was the need to meet the German threat, they contend 
instead that Fisher projected a far more ambitious, financially 
motivated programme of technologically driven reforms aimed at 
meeting the global threats posed by France and Russia. To this end, 
they claim that he wanted to enact fundamental changes to the force 
structure and fighting methods of the Royal Navy; abandon battleship 
construction altogether, defend mainland Britain with a ‘swarm’ of 
small torpedo craft, and protect the Empire with a new model of 
capital ship, the battle cruiser. Thus, instead of Marder’s battleship-
centred ‘Dreadnought revolution’, they propounded ‘Fisher’s naval 
revolution’, portraying the First Sea Lord as a ‘radical naval thinker’ 
whose hidden agenda was fundamentally to alter the manner in which 
the Royal Navy projected power and prosecuted future warfare. 
 
The revisionist analysis has been instrumental in causing the 
comfortable orthodoxy that Marder established to be questioned at 
several levels, but that does not mean it has been accepted itself. On 
the contrary, it is now confronted with a ‘post-revisionist’ perspective 
that challenges it at almost every level. In contrast both to Marder and 
his revisionist critics, these scholars see the changes that took place 
before 1914 as much more evolutionary than revolutionary. For these 
scholars the battle fleet, composed of large armoured warships, 
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remains central to explanations of the defence of the British Isles. 
Similarly, for these scholars, the new technologies on which 
revisionists lay such stress – including submarines, wireless and fire 
control systems – did not invalidate the existing defence paradigm; 
rather they augmented it with new capabilities and slowly caused it to 
adapt in appropriate ways. 
 
Why this difference? In part this reflects a stress on actions rather 
than intentions. For all its supporters’ talk of its great analytical 
breadth, the revisionist interpretation actually focuses rather narrowly 
upon the person of Jackie Fisher and his supposedly radical reformist 
agenda. Revisionists paint a picture of Fisher as a frustrated maverick, 
straining against the institutional conservatism of the Royal Navy with 
a mixed degree of success. Although he achieved much, he could 
never persuade his more conservative colleagues to adopt his more 
radical schemes, with the result that most of them never got off the 
drawing board – if they ever existed at all. This being so, for 
revisionists, the goal of their work – and also their principal challenge 
– is to outline the full extent of Fisher’s radical vision and then explain 
why his great transformative plans never came to pass, and why we 
should care about them. Post-revisionists have several problems with 
this approach. First, they question the validity of forming the historical 
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analysis of a complex administrative organ such as the Admiralty 
around one man, however remarkable he may have been. In that 
sense, referring to the naval history of the decade and a half before 
1914 as ‘the Fisher era’ and the reform process as ‘the Fisher 
revolution’ instrumentalizes an out-dated single-personality-driven-
approach to the period that is fundamentally inappropriate. Second, 
they question the conceptual merit of attempting to divine what Fisher 
may or may not have thought about the future of naval warfare as a 
starting point for the analysis of contemporary Admiralty policy. The 
First Sea Lord was a notoriously charismatic, complex and 
manipulative figure, skilled at adapting his message to his intended 
audience. Prioritizing the views he articulated at different times and in 
various contexts – sometimes only fleetingly – about things he 
ultimately did not do over and above the policies that he actually did 
introduce is to subordinate the reality of Fisher’s reforms to the 
intangible imperative of his fertile, but not always productive 
imagination. As such, this is a perfect example of what David Edgerton 
calls ‘anti-history’; the explaining of events that don’t need to be 
explained because they never actually happened. By contrast, the 
alternative perspective, of focusing on what did take place, is what 
post-revisionist seek to emphasize. 
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The goal of this special edition is to highlight the ways in which post-
revisionists reject the revisionist case. There are three principle 
justifications for such an endeavour. First, recent years have seen an 
enormous flourishing of the post-revisionist school. A large number of 
scholars have emerged who challenge all or part of the revisionist 
paradigm. This has led to numerous publications spread across a range 
of monographs, book chapters and articles. However, the sheer scale 
of post-revisionist writing will only be evident to the most diligent 
specialists. Nowhere is there a single site that attempts to provide a 
considered expression of the post-revisionist case across its full range. 
By placing together a group of articles by post-revisionist historians 
within one journal both the commonalities and the nuances of their 
positions can better be seen. Second, the post-revisionist critique has 
frequently been labelled by revisionist historians as merely an attempt 
to return to the old orthodoxy of the Marder years. The reality is quite 
different. The evolution of British naval policy as depicted by post-
revisionists is entirely distinct from the revolutionary changes 
advocated by Marder. Yet, this point can easily be missed as it has 
never been explicitly taken on. This special edition by showing how, 
where and why post-revisionists differ from the revisionist school will 
show why this charge is untenable and move the debate on to more 
accurate ground. Finally, by rendering the shortcomings of the 
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superficially authoritative revisionist interpretation open to non-
specialist historians, it is hoped that this edition will open the way for a 
major reconsideration of the role of the Royal Navy in British life and in 
its international context before and during the First World War. 
 
To achieve these aims, this edition consists of six articles. The first two 
set the ground by focusing upon the conceptual and methodological 
differences between the revisionist analysis and the post-revisionist 
critique. In the first, David Morgan-Owen tests the concept of the 
‘naval revolution’. Revisionist historians maintain that Fisher’s reforms 
collectively constituted a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and that 
such a revolution was what Fisher was deliberately trying to achieve. 
Such an analysis, which anachronistically applies a modern concept to 
a period in which neither the term nor the idea behind it had any 
currency, is open to serious objection on several grounds. Foremost 
amongst these, it assumes that the rapid technological change of the 
Fisher era necessitated a corresponding paradigm shift in the doctrines 
of naval warfare. Most notably, that it made a reliance on large 
armoured warships untenable and instead promoted strategies based 
upon flotilla craft in narrow seas and fast armoured cruisers on the 
high seas. Yet, upon closer examination it is clear that this was not the 
case and that many of the reforms Fisher instituted, far from being 
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revolutionary were underpinned by existing ideas and had been pre-
figured by earlier reforms. In short, Fisher further adapted a 
constantly evolving navy to new circumstances based upon his career-
long engagement with the issues. Thus, far from being a helpful means 
of understanding naval policy in the Fisher era, the application of the 
RMA concept has the distorting effect of imposing a sudden 
transformative paradigm shift where none in fact existed. 
 
Building upon this dissection of the revisionist mis-adaption of the RMA 
concept, is an article by Matthew Seligmann scrutinizing the evidential 
basis of the revisionist analysis. The revisionists have been highly 
critical of the manner in which previous generations of naval historians 
have approached the documentary record. Marder, for example, was 
dismissed by one as a mere ‘scissors-and-paste’ historian, a phrase 
intended to imply that he could only read documents literally and failed 
to appreciate how a proper assessment of their true context would 
impact upon the way in which they were understood. Furthermore, the 
revisionists have made much of their own supposedly more 
sophisticated research methodology, which they claim takes account of 
the broader context and so reveals the deeper insights that earlier 
historians missed. However, a detailed analysis of the approach to 
documentary analysis taken in the articulation of two key revisionist 
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arguments – flotilla defence and the ‘technical-tactical synthesis’ – 
demonstrates that the superior methodology in fact consists of little 
more than asserting that numerous surviving Admiralty files were not 
intended as accurate representations of the navy’s true policy, but as 
smokescreens intended to hide their real goals. Having by such means 
cast doubt on much of the extant documentary record and the 
interpretations that are grounded upon it, revisionists then advance 
alternative readings of Admiralty policy based upon speculative 
depictions of what they assume from their reading of the context must 
have been contained in now missing files. However, as this article 
demonstrates, if such dubious accusations of conspiracy and cover up 
are dismissed and a careful appreciation of surviving documents is 
prioritized over imaginative but nonetheless speculative hypotheses 
constructed largely on an archival vacuum, a very different picture 
emerges. 
 
The remaining four articles take the broad conceptual and 
methodological points articulated in the opening two papers and use 
them as a basis for systematically analysing specific revisionist claims 
and arguments. The first proposition to be tested is the ‘technical-
tactical synthesis’, Jon Sumida’s theory that in 1912 the Royal Navy 
abandoned long-range gunnery and developed a secret plan to fight 
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the expected future battle with the German fleet by means of a 
devastating pulse of rapid fire at medium range. Addressed in brief in 
the second paper, but purely in terms of how it mishandles the 
sources, this idea is now subjected to further and more detailed 
scrutiny from two alternative angles. First of all there is the tactical 
dimension. Stephen McLaughlin grounds his analysis of Sumida’s 
theory in a broad assessment of the developing tactical thinking of the 
Royal Navy’s fleet leadership up to the eve of the war. As he shows, 
far from building a fleet designed for a brief medium range battle, the 
Admiralty were investing heavily in two different battleship types – 
slower vessels that would fight at a distance and faster battleships that 
would seek to outflank the enemy. This was a procurements strategy 
that only made sense if engagements were expected to last some 
time, a prospect requiring long range gunnery. 
 
McLaughlin’s contentions are complemented by John Brooks’ analysis 
of the Royal Navy’s wartime gunnery exercises and developments in 
gunnery technique. If fighting units seek to perfect the techniques they 
intend to use in battle, then Brooks demonstrates conclusively that the 
technical-tactical synthesis was not what the Royal Navy was 
preparing to implement. Indeed, rather than fixating on one 
technologically driven engagement method, Brooks shows that the 
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Royal Navy prepared for a range of contingencies, of which long-range 
battle was the most favoured. 
 
The next article shifts the focus to Fisher’s supposedly decisive 
influence upon British naval policy even after his retirement in 1910. 
Revisionists have long argued that the wily admiral continued to 
dictate Admiralty policy through his influence over the young and 
ambitious First Lord, Winston Churchill. The reality, as Christopher Bell 
proves, is completely different. Whatever influence Fisher may have 
possessed, Churchill was definitely his own man and did things his own 
way. The suggestion to the contrary is based on a misreading of a 
small selection of sources, which, far from being put in the correct 
context, are consistently taken out of context. In addition, as Bell 
demonstrates there are also glaring inconsistencies within the 
revisionist case, a problem accentuated by the fact that Nicholas 
Lambert and Jon Sumida do not actually agree on what the ‘naval 
revolution’ was, and both have recently changed their own positions. 
The result is to misrepresent the Churchill era in spectacular and 
confusing fashion. 
 
The edition closes with a detailed assessment of the latest offering in 
the revisionist canon, Nicholas Lambert’s hypothesis that in 1914 the 
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British government had a short-war economic warfare strategy that 
would have led to victory had they possessed the courage and 
persistency to implement it fully. This argument, the latest in a long 
line of works that attempts to suggest that the slaughter in the 
trenches could have been avoided if only leaders had more 
imagination, is shown by John Coogan to rest on a very shaky 
documentary basis. Key archives in America and the vital evidence 
they contain are totally ignored, while British documents are 
consistently used in a selective fashion. The result is an unsustainable 
argument that follows the usual revisionist line of suggesting that 
there was a secret plan for which the evidence no longer exists 
courtesy of a deliberate cover up. Coogan’s analysis shows otherwise, 
demonstrating that by looking at the evidence available rather than 
the papers supposedly missing (although their existence cannot be 
proven) British economic warfare policy was anything but 
revolutionary. It was instead precisely what Sir Edward Grey, the 
British Foreign Secretary, said it was: an ad hoc wartime effort to 
‘secure the maximum of blockade that could be enforced without a 
rupture with the United States.’ 
 
Taken together, the six articles amassed here show a range of areas in 
which the ‘naval revolution’ argument of the revisionist school is under 
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scrutiny and offer an insight into some of the objections that have 
been raised to this concept. This is essential if we are to move away 
from the fruitless debate about Marder’s legacy and to start to move 
the naval history of the pre-First World War era forward again. This is 
now a lively, contested area full of new possibilities. To develop these 
fully, some of the older and now discredited ideas of a former era need 
to be torn down and some of the more speculative concepts of recent 
years need proper scrutiny. This special edition is a step in that 
direction. 
